MAJOR COURT DECISIONS9 2003

RUGGIERO v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir.

2003)
Issue: Whether the character qualifications in
the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000) violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States?
Holding: Denying the petition to review, the

court ruled that the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act ("RBPA") does not on its face violate the
First Amendment.
Discussion: Congress, in response to overwhelming numbers of pirated Low-Power FM ("LPFM")
radio stations, passed the RBPA, which prohibited
an applicant for a LPFM station from receiving a
license if he or she had ever operated a pirated
broadcast station in violation of the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Believing the
character qualifications were a content-based restriction, Ruggiero urged the court to apply intermediate scrutiny. The Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") asserted that the character
qualifications need only to withstand rational basis review. The court decided that a standard of
review somewhere between minimal scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. The court
agreed with the FCC's assessment that the character qualifications were unconnected to any content that an applicant had or might broadcast.
The qualifications related to the applicant operating an illegal broadcast station. The court, however, also ruled that the ineligibility of an applicant to ever obtain an LPFM license made rational basis review not stringent enough to protect
First Amendment rights. In ruling against Ruggiero, the court determined that there is a reasonable fit between the character qualifications and
the government interest in protecting the airwaves from unlicensed broadcast stations.
Summarized by: Jared Weaver

contracts established by telecommunications carriers with their residential customers.
Holding.Sections 201 (b) and 202(a) do not preempt the application of state law because state law
is now the congressionally intended method by
which to enforce the purposes of those sections.
Discussion: The court determined that the applicable preemption test was whether there is actual
conflict between federal and state law, such that
compliance with state law is an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of Congress's purposes
in enacting the federal law. In order to determine whether there is such conflict, the court
must look at both the objective of the federal law
and the method Congress chose to achieve that
objective. As combined, the two sections of the
Communications Act demonstrate Congress' intent that "customers receive fair and reasonable
rates from telecommunications carriers." 319
F.3d at 1138. Before the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("1996 Act") this congressional intent was
carried out by the filed rate doctrine, which guaranteed-through mandatory filing of rates with
the FCC-one published rate to all customers in a
given area. Through the 1996 Act, Congress eliminated the filing required, and thus eliminated
the only method of enforcing the intent expressed in Sections 201(b) and 202(a). The central purpose of the 1996 Act was detariffing-to
"replace the old monopoly-based regime with one
based on market competition" in order to depart
"from traditional 'regulatory' ways that coddled
monopolies." Id. at 1141, 1143 (citations omitted). The 1996 Act's provisions are intended to
be safeguarded by a competitive market that by its
very nature will maintain reasonable service rates,
and "this market-based method depends in part
on state law for the protection of consumers." Id.
at 1141. California's consumer protection and
contract laws do not interfere with Congress's
objectives and method.
Summarized by: Samantha Castronovo

v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)
Issue Whether Sections 201(b) and 202(a) of
the Communications Act preempt the application
of state consumer protection and contract laws to
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Issue: Whether the court's prior interpretation
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in AT&T
v. City of Portland controls review of the FCC's decision to classify Internet service provided by cable
companies exclusively as an interstate "information service."
Holding: The court held that AT&T v. City of
Portland's interpretation remains binding in the
circuit, even in light of the FCC's contrary interpretation of the 1996 Act, and cable broadband
service was not a "cable service" but instead was
part "telecommunications service" and part "information service." Affirmed in part, vacated in
part and remanded.
Discussion: Petitions were filed by corporations,
organizations, and the State of California seeking
review of the FCC's Declaratory Ruling that cable
modem service was not a "cable service," but was
classified as an interstate "information service"
within the meaning of the 1996 Act. See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
Brand X, Earthlink, the State of California and
the Consumer Federation of America argued that
cable modem service is both an information service and a telecommunications service, and is
therefore subject to regulation on a common carriage basis, meaning that cable broadband providers must be required to let other ISPs use their
facilities. The National League of Cities, the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors, the United States Conference
of Mayors, the National Association of Counties,
the Texas Coalition for Cities for Utilities Issues,
and others argued that cable modem service is
both an information service and a cable service,
and therefore is subject to regulation by local authorities as provided in the 1996 Act. Finally, Verizon argued that the FCC Declaratory Ruling was
correct, but that the FCC should have also ruled
that digital subscriber line ("DSL") service provided by telephone companies, like cable modem
service, is an information service.
In AT&T v. Portland, the court held that cable
modem service is not exclusively an information
service, but contains a "transmission element"
that is a "telecommunications service." The court
held that it was bound by its decision in Portland
under the doctrine of stare decisis. The two sepa-
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rate concurring opinions reflected the views of
the authors, and not the court.
Summarized by: Megan Wilson

GA. POWER CO. v. TELEPORT COMM.
ATLANTA, INC., 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 19989
(11th Cir. 2003)
Issue Plaintiff in this case, Georgia Power Company ("Georgia Power") raises several issues for
review in attempting to identify the errors in the
FCC's final order affirming the decision to reduce
Georgia Power's pole attachment rates imposed
by the Cable Services Bureau in favor of Teleport
Communications Atlanta ("Teleport"). The issues
presented for review include: whether the FCC's
placing burden of proof on Georgia Power to establish the average number of attaching entities
and subsequent acceptance of Teleport's standard, though lacking factual support, was arbitrary and capricious; whether FCC acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in "independently
adopting" rebuttable presumptions as to the average number of entities allowed in pole attachment and applying that standard to Georgia
Power; whether the FCC's refusal to allow additional evidence from Georgia Power regarding average number of attaching entities was arbitrary
and capricious; whether FCC's definition of "attaching entities" for determining the telecommunications rate was contrary to the plain language
of the Pole Attachments Act; whether FCC's assertion of jurisdiction prior to formal negotiations
between Georgia Power and Teleport was, again,
in violation of the plain language of the 1996 Act;
and whether the FCC had committed a taking of
property by failing to provide Georgia Power with
just compensation for its property.
Holding The court denied Georgia Power's petition to review an FCC order which affirmed the
decision of the FCC's Cable Service Bureau to
substantially reduce Georgia Power's annual pole
rental rate. First, the court held that by failing to
supply the FCC with the methodology and underlying data that supported its rate, Georgia Power
failed to carry its burden to justify its pole attachment rate and the information provided was
based on only on data favorable to Georgia
Power. Next, the court held that the FCC's "independent adoption of an average number of at-
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tachers" was not retroactive rulemaking because it
did not impose liability for past conduct. The
court also held that the FCC's denial of Georgia
Power's motion to provide additional evidence regarding the average number of attachers was not
arbitrary and capricious, but discretionary in accordance with statute. Additionally, the court deferred to the FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.C.
Section 224(e) and found the FCC's interpretation of "attaching entitities" reasonable. As for
further negotiations between Georgia Power and
Teleport, the court agreed with the FCC's conclusion that further negotiations would be inconsequential due to Georgia Power's unilateral attempt to fix the price for pole attachment. Finally, the court held that the 1996 Act's mandated
telecom rate provided Georgia Power with just
compensation for use of its tower and rejected the
claim.
Discussion: The court found that Georgia Power
had the burden to supply the FCC with information to justify its pole attachment rate. Georgia
Power based its pole attachment rate on replacement cost theory which was more favorable to
Georgia Power's position rather than the FCC's
historic cost methodology. Therefore, the court
found that the FCC was correct in finding that
Georgia Power failed to meets its burden of supplying the methodology and underlying data to
support its rate. In finding that the FCC's "independent adoption of an average number of attachers" was not rulemaking, the court found it
reasonable for the FCC to rely upon information
it developed during the rulemaking for In re Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 12,103
(2001).
In regards to the FCC's denial of Georgia
Power's motion seeking supplemental submissions related to its rate calculations, the court
found nothing arbitrary or capricious about the
FCC's decision. The court acknowledged the
FCC's well-established procedure regarding supplemental submissions in pole attachment disputes and found that while the FCC rules allow
for additional filings, the rules are merely permissive, not mandatory.
In regards to Georgia Power's attack on the
FCC's definition of the term "attaching entities,"
the court used the two-step analysis from Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Def. Council, Inc., 47

U.S. 837 (1984). Under the first prong of Chevron,
the court found that the term "attaching entity" is
ambiguous as defined in 47 U.S.C. Section
224(e). The second prong of Chevron calls on the
court to defer to the agency's interpretation as
long as that interpretation is reasonable. The
court found the FCC's interpretation of the statute, that Congress would not have used the general term "entity" in 47 U.S.C. Section 224(3) if it
meant to limit the term "attaching entity" to only
cable and telecom providers, "eminently" reasonable. Additionally, Georgia Power argued that the
FCC intervened prematurely by not allowing "real
negotiations" between the parties before ruling
on Teleport's complaint. The court agreed with
the FCC that the parties' positions had 'jelled"
and that further negotiations would be fruitless.
The court relied on Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311
F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002) to find that Georgia
Power was justly compensated for the taking mandated by the 1996 Act. The court analogized that
if Alabama Power Co. was justly compensated by
the 1996 Act's mandated cable rate, which is a
lower rate than the mandated telecom rate, then
Georgia Power was adequately compensated by
the mandated telecom rate.
Summarized by: J Andrew Reynolds

CORP. V. MINNESOTA
PUB. UTIL.'S COMM'N, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
VONAGE

HOLDINGS

18451 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2003).
Issue. Does Vonage, a provider of voice over Internet protocol ("VoIP"), provide an information
service or a telecommunications service?
Holding. Ruling that Vonage does not provide a
telecommunications service, the court found that
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
("MPUC") does not have the authority to regulate
VoIP because Congress has not provided any statutory intent to regulate it. The court, in turn,
granted Vonage's motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the MPUC's order requiring
Vonage to comply with Minnesota's telecommunications statutes and rules.
Discussion: The court determined that VolP is
an information service because it offers the "capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunica-
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tions ....

." 47

U.S.C. Section 153 (20). Bolstering

its argument that VoIP is an information service,
the court ruled that VoIP did not meet the FCC's
four phone-to-phone IP telephony conditions,
which may have rendered VoIP as a telecommunications service. The court then asserted that Congress has drawn a distinction between telecommunications and information services and has de-
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cided that the latter remain unregulated. As an
information service, VoIP-according to the
court-should remain unregulated, thus leaving
the court to conclude that federal and state law
conflict and pre-emption is necessary.
Summarized by: Jared Weaver

